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i. A neW YeAR AnD An eLeCTion CYCLe. Last year began with the Acquisition Advisory Panel 
(AAP), a blue-ribbon commission launched in 2003 by Section 1423 of the Services Acquisition Reform 
Act (SARA), transitioning its report from “Draft Final” to Final. History will reflect that, while the report 
can be conveniently accessed on the Internet, at www.acquisition.gov/comp/aap/finalaapreport.html, 
the superb cover photo of the Capitol at night sets a new standard for the presentation of an acquisition 
study effort and also permits dual use of the report as an attractive coffee table book. This year begins 
with Congress rushing headlong towards the establishment of a Wartime Contracting Commission 
with a broad mandate and the potential to wreak havoc in the critical fight for the resources needed to 
stabilize, let alone improve, the federal acquisition system. But more on that below.
A. Sobering news. The most unexpected development during 2007 was also the most discon-
certing and tragic. Deborah Howell, in A Story Punctuated by Death, Wash. Post (November 5, 2007), 
explained:
The Post ran a Page 1 story about a temporary Pentagon assignment given a retired 
Air Force officer by a defense contractor. [Two weeks later], the officer, Lt. Col. Charles 
Riechers, was found dead, apparently a suicide.... O’Harrow wrote that Riechers went to 
work for Commonwealth Research Institute, a nonprofit defense contractor.... Riechers 
was awaiting appointment … to the No. 2 job in Air Force procurement, a political 
position. O’Harrow quoted Riechers: “I really didn’t do anything for CRI.” Instead, he 
worked for Sue C. Payton, assistant Air Force secretary for acquisition, on projects with 
no connection to CRI.... The Air Force asked CRI to take on Riechers for two months 
under an existing SETA–science, engineering and technical assistance–contract....
See also, Zachary A. Goldfarb, Procurement Official Questioned About No-Work Deal Found Dead, Wash. 
Post (October 16, 2007); Robert O’Harrow Jr., Senators Ask for Explanation on Contracting Deal, Wash. 
Post (October 5, 2007); Robert O’Harrow Jr., Air Force Helped Civilian Nominee Get Paycheck From 
Nonprofit Defense Firm for No Work, Wash. Post (September 30, 2007). Once again, we are reminded that 
the procurement community operates under intense scrutiny, public procurement is more that “business 
as usual,” and – as we discuss at length below – whether in success or failure, it’s all about people. 
B. Procurement in an election Year. With the Presidential election looming, candidates increas-
ingly will jockey to score points by excoriating high-profile procurement failures, both macro and micro. 
But don’t expect to hear the candidates engaged in a serious national conversation demanding: (1) an 
unprecedented effort to hire, train, and integrate the huge cadre of highly skilled business profession-
als necessary to manage the government’s burgeoning contractor workforce (upon which the nation’s 
functioning depends); (2) the massive government hiring binge – civilian and military – required to staff 
the government’s current mandates (if, as a nation, we truly desire to depend less upon contractors); or 
(3) a significant reduction in the services that the government provides to the public (ranging from defense – 
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at home and abroad – to air traffic control and food safety). The problems facing 
the acquisition system – particularly those involving the workforce – identify 
a unique need for leadership, and the upcoming election highlights the chal-
lenge. The acquisition community, the nuances of the procurement regime, 
and the demands inherent in purchasing $400 billion annually of services, 
supplies, and construction are invisible to the public. Similarly, the public 
has no grasp on the direct relationship between increased outsourcing and 
the need to invest heavily in the acquisition workforce. In a competitive race, 
the candidates have to speak to the issues the public cares about; there’s no 
time to try to focus the public on the issues they should care about. Given the 
stakes, it’s important to get a sense of what the candidates are saying.
Hillary Clinton’s “comprehensive, 10-point plan to restore Americans’ 
confidence in their government by increasing transparency and cutting waste 
and corruption … includes: ... Ending abuse of no-bid government contracts 
and posting all contracts online[, and c]utting 500,000 government contrac-
tors.” www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/reform/
John edwards asserts, at www.johnedwards.com/issues/, that he would:
 Root Out Cronyism and Waste and Increase Efficiency in 
the Pentagon: .... [He would] launch a comprehensive, tough 
review of fraud, waste, and abuse, such as missile defense and 
offensive space-based weapons, that are costly and unlikely 
to work … [and] overhaul the rules governing privatization 
and punish mismanagement.
...
[He would m]odernize our forces, so we do not keep spending 
money on systems that only meet the needs of today, not 
tomorrow. “Greening the military” to increase innovation, save 
millions of dollars, reduce reliance on vulnerable supply lines.
Rudy Giuliani, www.joinrudy2008.com/issues/view/1, asserts that he 
would “impose fiscal discipline and accountability through a combination of 
executive action and legislative reform.” More specifically, he would:
Require Agencies to Identify at Least 5% to 20% in Spending 
Reductions: Requiring agency heads to identify savings 
and increased efficiencies in each annual budget … is a 
management tool that will lead to constant streamlining 
and more cost-effective government spending without 
compromising national security in the search for savings…. 
[He also would] Reduce the Federal Civilian Workforce by 
20% through Attrition and Retirement … [and] Replace only 
half, making the Federal government smaller and smarter 
through increased use of technology and privatization.
Mike Huckabee has not yet addressed procurement-related topics, but 
his macro-level approach to government is articulated at www.mikehuckabee.
com/?FuseAction=Issues.Home. He is:
running to completely eliminate all federal income and payroll 
taxes… [including] personal federal, corporate federal, gift, 
estate, capital gains, alternative minimum, Social Security, 
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Medicare, self-employment. ... Instead we will have the FairTax, 
a simple tax based on wealth. When the FairTax becomes law, 
it will be like waving a magic wand releasing us from pain and 
unfairness.
...
[O]ur massive deficit is not due to Americans’ being under-
taxed, but due to the federal government’s over-spending. ... 
To achieve a balanced federal budget, … the President should 
have the line-item veto.
...
Our current armed forces aren’t large enough.... [He] will 
increase the defense budget. ... without raising taxes. [He] 
will limit increases in other discretionary spending and 
rely on the normal increase in federal tax revenue that is 
generated annually as Americans’ incomes rise.
John McCain “believes we must enlarge the size of our armed forces 
to meet new challenges to our security,” www.johnmccain.com/Informing/ 
Issues/, and further asserts:
“Earmarked dollars have doubled just since 2000, and more 
than tripled in the last 10 years. … The time for us to fix this 
broken process is long overdue.” … [He] would shine the 
disinfecting light of public scrutiny on those who abuse the 
public purse, use the power of the presidency to restore fiscal 
responsibility, and exercise the veto pen to enforce it.
...
Modernizing American armed forces involves procuring 
advanced weapons systems that will help rapidly and 
decisively defeat any adversary and protect American lives… 
and [ensuring] that America’s combat personnel have the 
best safety and survivability equipment available. 
...
McCain has worked aggressively to reform the defense budgeting 
process…. Includ[ing] reforming defense procurement to ensure 
the faithful and efficient expenditure of taxpayer dollars that 
are made available for defense acquisition. … [He] supports 
significant reform in our defense acquisition process to ensure 
that dollars spent actually contribute to U.S. security. 
Barack obama would “Shine the Light on Federal Contracts, Tax 
Breaks and Earmarks,” by among other things, creating a “‘contracts and 
influence’ database that will disclose how much federal contractors spend 
on lobbying, and what contracts they are getting and how well they com-
plete them.” http://origin.barackobama.com/issues/ethics/ He also as-
serts, at www.barackobama.com/pdf/TakingBackOurGovernmentBack 
FinalFactSheet.pdf at 2, that:
The current Administration has abused its power by handing 
out contracts without competition to its politically connected 
friends and supporters. These abuses cost taxpayers billions 
of dollars each year. According to a report by the Center for 
American Progress, during just the last three years more than 
five federal officials have been convicted of crimes involving 
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federal contracting, three others were placed under indictment, 
and more are under investigation. Barack Obama will end 
abuse of no-bid contracts. He will require that all contract 
orders over $25,000 be competitively awarded unless the 
contracting officer provides written justification that the order 
falls within a specified exception and that the requirements 
and evaluation criteria are clear for every contract.
Mitt Romney, www.mittromney.com/Issues/curbing-federal-spending, 
explains:
Politicians … in Washington, D.C. have spent too much money 
on too many programs for far too long. … The competition for 
pork barrel spending and the prevailing practice of out of control 
earmarking has contributed greatly to a culture of corruption 
in Washington that has tarnished both parties and led to a 
lack of faith and trust in America’s elected representatives.
With few exceptions, we fear that 2008 could be another year in which things 
get worse before they get better. Nor, at this point, should we expect a leader-
ship epiphany after the 2008 elections.
ii. A GooD YeAR FoR TRAnSPARenCY AnD FeDeRAL PRoCURe-
MenT DATA. Last year, we discussed the Federal Procurement Data System- 
Next Generation (FPDS-NG), and we hoped that this year we would be able to 
determine whether that platform would serve as a useful outsourcing success 
story. There’s little question that, for many public users, FPDS-NG provides 
data more quickly than its in-house predecessor. To the extent that it failed to 
provide answers to commonly asked questions and permit users to access the 
wealth of data it contained, however, FPDS seems to have lost its stranglehold 
on delivery of federal procurement data. Ironically, competition has increased 
transparency into the federal procurement data marketplace.
OMB Watch, “a nonprofit government watchdog organization,” which 
“exists to increase government transparency and accountability; to ensure 
sound, equitable regulatory and budgetary processes and policies; and to 
protect and promote active citizen participation in our democracy” was first 
to market with FedSpending.org. Its purpose was clear: “OMB Watch started 
development of this website after years of frustration over not being able to 
obtain information about federal contracts and grants.” In the spirit of trans-
parency, OMB Watch conceded, at the time, that: “We hope this site serves as 
a prototype for the recently passed Federal Accountability and Transparency 
Act passed in Congress that requires [OMB] to provide a free online database 
of all federal spending.” Its hope was fulfilled.
USASpending.gov is now the government’s single searchable website 
intended to satisfy the mandate of the Federal Funding Accountability and 
Transparency Act of 2006. The website concedes that: “The underlying tech-
nology for USAspending.gov was developed by OMB Watch ... and is used on 
OMB Watch’s website.... The [contract] data available on USAspending.gov is 
provided by the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS).” It seems reason-
able to ask why the FPDS and USASpending.gov have not been combined or 
whether they will be in the future. New users to USASpending.gov will be 
impressed with the ease with which they can generate, among other things, 
summary data quantifying, for example:
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• Federal Contract Awards by Contractor State [note: Virginia, Cali-
fornia, and Texas lead the pack for 2006];
• Federal Contract Awards by Contractor Congressional District 
[note: Virginia 8th District (James P. Moran), Texas 12th (Kay 
Granger), and Virginia 10th (Frank R. Wolf) top the 2006 list];
• Federal Contract Awards by Major Contracting Agency [Defense, 
Energy, HHS, NASA, DHS, and GSA are the top six for 2006]; or
• Federal Contract Awards by Extent (or Type) of Competition [for 
2006, Full and open competition, 36 percent; Not competed, 26 per-
cent; Full and open competition, but only one bid, 11 percent, etc.].
Moreover, contractor-specific searches are convenient and informative. Simply type 
in a contractor’s name and you can extract summary information including: 
• Contract dollars and number of transactions, per year;
• Agencies purchasing from the contractor;
• Products or services sold; 
• Trend data (comparing annual contracting totals over time); or
• A list of the contracts awarded.
You can even filter the amount of information you want on individual contactors, 
choosing “levels of detail” between low, medium, high, extensive, and complete 
(although the latter categories may take additional time, depending upon the 
contractor activity). Moreover, as agencies struggle to make information avail-
able in real time, USASpending.gov explains that it: “will report transparently 
on three categories of data quality: completeness, timeliness, and accuracy. 
In Spring 2008, the quality of agency data will be assessed and their status 
for each of these categories will be reported candidly and transparently.” For 
example, at a recent viewing, most agencies were reported between 60 and 71 
in terms of “percentage (%) completeness/availability of the data.”
iii. Procurement Matters: The Upward Spending Trend Continues. Each 
year in this decade, we’ve marveled at the increased volume and rate of federal 
procurement spending. We assumed that the growth would taper, and, to some 
extent, the growth rate has slowed. But annual warnings that the spending in-
crease was a blip, and a contraction was imminent, never transitioned into fact. 
Further, suggestions remain that that the growth cycle has not yet run its course. 
Immigration Control Contracts: The Next Government Spending Binge?, 49 GC 
¶ 272. Looking back, what is particularly striking is how dramatically the rapid 
growth in federal government contracting has outpaced the rate of inflation. 
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Fiscal
Year
Procurement Spending 
(in Billions)
% Increase From 
Previous Year
% Increase in Consumer 
Price Index (CPI)
2006 $415.4 6.6 3.2
2005 $389.6 8.9 3.4
2004 $357.7 9.6 2.7
2003 $326.4 18.6 2.3
2002 $275.2 17.0 1.6
2001 $235.2 7.2 2.8
2000 $219.3
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See Federal Procurement Data System, Trending Analysis Report Since Fiscal 
Year 2000 (2006), available at www.fpdsng.com/downloads/top_requests/ 
FPDSNG5YearViewOnTotals.xls. Annual increases in the Consumer Price 
Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) were extracted from the annual Con-
sumer Price Index Detailed Report Tables, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics available at www.bls.gov/cpi/cpi_dr.htm#2007. 
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the rate of growth in federal procurement 
spending has exceeded the rate of increases in the consumer price index 
(CPI) every year in this decade. But even that understates the enormity 
of the growth. During that period, the pace of procurement spending more 
than doubled the rate of inflation each year. (And, yes, procurement spending 
growth more than tripled the rate of inflation in 2002, 2003, and 2004.) Overall, 
as indicated in Figure 2, from 2000 through the end of 2006, the consumer 
price index rose only 17.1 percent, while federal procurement spending rose 
by 89.2 percent. In other words, in this decade, federal procurement spend-
ing rose at a rate five times the rate of inflation. We have to assume that that 
can’t be a sustainable trend. 
The elephant in the room is that, increasingly, the lion’s share of procure-
ment is for services. The growth in service contracting is nicely documented 
by the Commercial Activities Panel April 2002 Final Report, Improving the 
Sourcing Decisions of the Government, available at http://sharea76.fedworx.
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org. “In 1986, supplies and equipment accounted for the bulk of contracting 
dollars – about . . . 55 percent of total spending. By fiscal year 2001, however, 
the largest acquisition category was services at . . . 51 percent of total spend-
ing.” Id. at 25-27. Figure 5, on page 17 of that report, offers a stark visual 
representation of this trend. The combination of three trends – the relentless 
shift towards services contracting, the growth in federal procurement spend-
ing, and the underinvestment in the acquisition workforce (discussed below) – 
makes it difficult to predict that the golden age of federal procurement is on 
the horizon.
iV. ReFoRM AnD THe AFTeRMATH oF THe ACQUiSiTion AD-
ViSoRY PAneL. As noted above, 2007 began with the final report of the 
Acquisition Advisory Panel (AAP), a blue-ribbon commission launched in 2003 
by Section 1423 of the Services Acquisition Reform Act (SARA). See www.
acquisition.gov/comp/aap/draftfinalreport.html. Although not clearly related 
to the report’s findings, many familiar topics – commercial item purchasing; 
competition; incomplete contracts; interagency contracting; uniformity of the 
FAR system; even the explosive, unmanaged growth of time-and-materials 
contracting – continue to bubble on the surface as potential areas of reform. 
See, e.g., DOD Seeks to Extend TINA to Some Commercial-Item Procure-
ments, 49 GC ¶ 157; OFPP Administrator Calls for Competition Enhancement 
Through Competition Advocate, 49 GC ¶ 230; DOD Should Enhance Oversight 
of Undefinitized Contract Actions, GAO Says, 49 GC ¶ 252; Ralph C. Nash, In-
teragency Contracting: It’s Not A Way To Avoid Legal Requirements, 21 N&CR 
¶ 51 (“One benefit of the spree of interagency contracting that has occurred in 
recent years is that we have learned a lot of important legal rules applying to 
such contracts.”); House Committee Questions TSA’s FAR Exemption, 49 GC 
¶ 299 (it’s about time, eh?); DOD T&M Contract Controls Need Improvement, 
GAO Says, 49 GC ¶ 270; Vernon J. Edwards, The New Clause for Payments Un-
der Noncommercial Time-and-Materials and Labor-Hours Contracts: An End 
To The Confusion?, 21 N&CR ¶ 15; Vernon J. Edwards, Time-and-Materials 
and Labor-Hour Contracts for Commercial Items: A Significant Departure 
From Tradition, 21 N&CR ¶ 5; Poor Contracting Procedures Waste Funds, 
HUD IG Says, 49 GC ¶ 254; GAO Updates High-Risk List, 49 GC ¶ 59.
A. Aggressive Legislative Agenda: Stay Tuned. The number and 
scale of suggestions and legislative remedies for the procurement system rival 
those seen during the peak of the 1990’s reform movement that produced the 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act and the Clinger-Cohen Act. Despite all 
of the congressional activity, however, 2007 concluded before we saw whether 
the lion’s share of the major procurement initiatives would become law. See, 
generally, FY 2008 Defense Authorization Act Includes Significant Acquisition 
Reforms, 49 GC ¶ 476; Congress Sends Defense Bill With Additional Funding 
For Contract Oversight, 49 GC ¶ 434; Senate Approves Legislation Targeting 
Federal Contracting Shortcomings, 49 GC ¶ 433; Senate Committee Approves 
Accountability in Government Contracting Act, 49 GC ¶ 303; Committee Hears 
Testimony On Accountability in Government Contracting Act, 49 GC ¶ 280; 
Senate Hears IG Community’s Views on Improving Government Accountability 
Act, 49 GC ¶ 253; SARA Panel Recommendations Stymie Procurement Reform 
Progress, Services Group Says, 49 GC ¶ 122; House Passes Contracting Reform 
Bill, 49 GC ¶ 117; House Committees Approve Acquisition Reform Bill, 49 GC 
¶ 105; Acquisition Advisory Panel Calls For More Competition, Transparency 
in Government Procurements, 49 GC ¶ 2. Our practical fear is that, even if 
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Congress were to adopt all of the pending legislative solutions, it might take 
a professional lifetime to train the existing acquisition workforce to imple-
ment the changes.
B. Good Tidings on Prototyping. We were particularly intrigued, nay, 
pleased, to learn that DOD appears to have rediscovered competitive prototyp-
ing. See, e.g., Navy Endorses Competitive Prototype Policy, 49 GC ¶ 466. See 
Under Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject: Prototyping and Competi-
tion, September 19, 2007 (“Lessons of the past, and the recommendations of 
multiple reviews, including the Packard Commission report, emphasize the 
need for, and benefits of, quality prototyping.”); David Architzel, Subject: Pro-
totyping and Competition (P07-005), “All pending and future ACAT I programs 
will be planned, funded and executed based on technology development and 
acquisition strategies that provide for two or more competing teams producing 
key system or sub system prototypes.”, available at www.acquisition.navy.
mil/content/view/full/5492. See also, Ralph C. Nash, Postscript: Weapon 
System Procurement Planning, 21 N&CR ¶ 54 (“[C]ompetitive prototyping is 
the most effective strategy… It’s good to see that it has not been forgotten.”); 
Ralph C. Nash & Vernon J. Edwards, Weapon System Procurement Planning: 
A Memory Loss, 21 N&CR ¶ 14 (“It appears that there is little institutional 
memory in today’s Government procurement process. ... [T]he long-awaited 
Request for Proposals for the new Air Force tanker ... adopts the acquisition 
strategy of a total package procurement, implicitly rejecting the competitive 
prototyping strategy. Twenty years ago, competitive prototyping was in vogue 
and total package procurement was banned.”)
V. WHeRe THe RUBBeR MeeTS THe RoAD: THe ACQUiSiTion 
WoRKFoRCe. Last year, we bemoaned that, unfortunately, despite all of 
the credit it deserves for adding the acquisition workforce to its mandate, 
the Acquisition Advisory Panel came up short on its ultimate recommenda-
tions and surrendered to the threshold issues of process rather than demand 
action. The longstanding information vacuum provided an easy excuse. The 
Panel concluded that it lacked sufficient, credible information on the size, 
composition, or strength of the acquisition workforce to make meaningful 
recommendations as to the target size of the acquisition workforce. That’s 
disappointing. It seems to us that all of the empirical–macro and micro–and 
anecdotal evidence leads to the inescapable conclusion that there are too few 
qualified acquisition professionals to meet the government’s needs today and 
for the foreseeable future.
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A. not a Pretty Picture. Again, just to review, look at Figure 3 (from last 
year’s materials) and consider that: the federal acquisition workforce declined 
dramatically due to congressionally mandated personnel reductions in the 
mid-1990’s; arguably, the government has not hired an appropriate number 
of new acquisition professionals in any year since the 1980’s; the existing 
workforce is aging and, in large part, is retirement eligible; the lion’s share of 
that workforce was neither hired nor trained to primarily purchase services 
using flexible contractual vehicles; and, as discussed above, the volume of 
purchasing has increased (or, as some might, say, exploded) in this decade. 
That’s a recipe for disaster.
Accordingly, we remain disappointed, but are no longer surprised that 
the debate over the need to restore the acquisition workforce continues. See, 
generally, OFPP Releases 2007 Acquisition Workforce Survey Results, 49 GC 
¶ 414 (anonymous self-assessment); Davis Bill Calls for Rehiring Retirees to 
Alleviate Workforce Shortages, 49 GC ¶ 365; DHS Acquisition Management 
Needs Improvement, GAO Says, 49 GC ¶ 352 (“DHS acquisition management 
lacks clear and transparent policies and processes and a capable acquisition 
workforce”); Panel to Congress: More Contracting Personnel, Not More Laws, 49 
GC ¶ 260; FAI Report Stems Debate Over Acquisition Workforce Numbers, 49 
GC ¶ 229; Federal Acquisition Institute, Annual Report on the Federal Acquisi-
tion Workforce Fiscal Year 2006 (May 2007) (describing the stagnant acquisi-
tion workforce that employed 57,835 in 2000 and 58,723 in 2006), available 
at www.fai.gov/pdfs/FAI%20annual%20workforce%20report%202007.pdf; 
Senate Committee Criticizes DHS Acquisition Management Structure, 49 GC 
¶ 231; Doomsday Reports About Acquisition Workforce Not Accurate, But 
Strategic Management Needed, DAU Chief Says, 49 GC ¶ 176. But see Ralph 
C. Nash, Dateline, February 2007, 21 N&CR (discussing the AAP Report and 
concluding: “while we don’t expect miracles, it would be helpful to see uniform 
acceptance of the finding that the Government has a real problem and that 
the first step in improving the acquisition process must be improving the 
workforce.”); DOD Acts on Audit Recommendations, Discusses Future Work-
force Movement, 49 GC ¶ 100; Acquisition Transformation: DOD Issues First 
Report to Congress, 49 GC ¶ 99; SASC Grapples with Acquisition Workforce, 
Competition Concerns, 49 GC ¶ 44; DHS Acquisition Management Chal-
lenges Remain, IG Says, 49 GC ¶ 6. See also, Ralph C. Nash, The Acquisition 
Workforce: Technical Competence Is Required, 21 N&CR ¶ 59 (“For quite a 
while we have been wondering how contracting agencies would cope with the 
steady drain of personnel with the technical competence to carry out their 
mission.... It’s somewhat shocking that an agency procuring helicopter services 
had no technical person with the expertise to deal with this issue – at either 
the original evaluation level or at the agency protest level.... It is also a clear 
indication of the need to prevent such loss of essential capabilities.”)
B. Three Cheers For the Gansler Commission! We fully recognize the 
absence of political will to solve the problem. But we were heartened by, and 
pause to applaud, the uniquely honest and insightful appraisal delivered by the 
so-called Gansler Commission. We hope that it serves as an example for others 
to follow. The recent Army study recommended, among other things, increasing 
the Army’s contracting workforce by 1,400 professionals, which would involve 
about a 25 percent increase. While the Army is typically one of the largest pro-
curing agencies, it accounts (in any given year) for 15-25 percent of the federal 
acquisition budget and, historically, has better staffed the procurement function 
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than many civilian agencies (such as, for example, the Department of Homeland 
Security). See Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management 
in Expeditionary Operations, Urgent Reform Required: Army Expeditionary 
Contracting (Oct. 31, 2007) [hereinafter “Gansler Commission”], available at 
www.army.mil/docs/Gansler_Commission_Report_Final_071031.pdf; see, also, 
Army Creates Contracting Brigade: Plans to Bolster Acquisition Workforce, 49 
GC ¶ 464; Contracting Should Be Core Competency, Army Commission Says, 
49 GC ¶ 422. Among other things, the report explains: “[S]ince the Cold War 
terminated, the Department of Defense . . . made significant changes to adapt 
to meet the expected challenges. . . . Over this same period the Army has tran-
sitioned many jobs that were previously performed by individuals in uniform … 
to performance by contractors.” Unfortunately, altering the ratio is not without 
costs. The “Commission [found it apparent] . . . that the Institutional Army has 
not made the necessary adaptations to the operational policy to extensively 
outsource support services (in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, over 160,000 
contractors—over 50 percent of the total force). Since these services are needed, 
and now are being provided by commercial vendors instead of organically, they 
can now only be fulfilled through the acquisition process; more specifically, by 
personnel who are specialists in contracting. If the military commander has 
gained riflemen, but not added contract professionals who can acquire the sup-
port services his unit needs, then he has lost capability.”
Fortunately, the Gansler Commission did not similarly avoid the critical 
issue demanding attention; instead it sounded a clarion call for restoration 
and reinvigoration of the acquisition workforce: “The … Army contracting com-
munity has reached a ‘tipping point’ that requires extraordinary action.” One 
of the most prescient points in the Gansler report is that: “Too often it takes 
a crisis to bring about major change–the Iraq/Kuwait/Afghanistan contract-
ing problems have created a crisis!” Neither the Army, or for that matter the 
DHS (discussed at some length below), is alone in facing this crisis. Indeed, 
this problem–pervasive reliance upon contractors without sufficient qualified 
personnel to properly manage these contractual relationships–bedevils the 
entire federal government. Maybe the Army will lead the way with an aggres-
sive response to the Gansler report. Change must begin somewhere.
C. Hiring the Future: Daunting Challenges. Even if Congress came 
to its collective senses, however, and promptly invested in rebuilding the 
workforce, the recruiting impediments appear severe. “Harshly critical over-
sight and bad press have also had an undesirable effect [on recruiting]. One 
[participant] asked why a young person would go into contracting, given 
how the government’s contracting function is portrayed in the press. The 
participant said that publicity, created in part by the ‘gotcha’ approach of 
some in the auditing community, turns off potential new hires and hurts the 
existing workforce, causing federal employee attrition.” U.S. Gov’t Account-
ability Office, GAO-07-45SP, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Federal Acquisition 
Challenges and Opportunities in the 21st Century (Oct. 2006), available at 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d0745sp.pdf. Moreover, anecdotal evidence contin-
ues to demonstrate the difficulty of retaining government expertise in the 
face of rising private sector compensation. See, e.g., Testimony of Secretary 
of Defense Robert M. Gates, Hearing of the Senate Committee on Appropria-
tions: The President’s FY 2008 Supplement Request for the Wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (Sept. 26, 2007) (“My personal concern about some of these 
security contracts is that I worry that sometimes the salaries that they are 
9-10
© 2008 Thomson West
NOTES
able to pay in fact lure some of our soldiers out of the service to go work for 
them.”). As the Professional Services Council has suggested, “the answer 
lies principally in aggressively addressing the government’s human capital 
challenges. These include reversing personnel procedures and policies that 
inhibit and discourage talented individuals from pursuing a federal career 
and the development of skills and resources necessary to meet immediate 
and emerging needs.” PSC Response to the Center on American Progress, at 
www.pscouncil.org/pdfs/centerwhitepaper.pdf.
D. Don’t Fight oversight; But Don’t expect it to Fix Things either. 
We continue to advocate that an ounce of prevention is a better investment 
than a pound of cure. But, criticizing the auditors and those engaged in 
oversight is not productive. See e.g., Ralph C. Nash, Dateline, May 2007, 21 
N&CR, discussing the “constant drumbeat claiming that federal agency In-
spectors General are discouraging the acquisition workforce from performing 
their work in an optimum fashion.” We, like Nash, “just don’t get it.” In fact, 
“[s]implifying the [procurement] process to more effectively serve the agency 
has little or nothing to do with compliance.” We agree that:
[A] new crop of acquisition personnel … need to understand 
that Government procurement requires transparency and 
documentation. ... If they have obtained competition and 
made a sound decision, there is no reason to feel threatened. 
... [T]he procurement system is governed by a set of rules 
and … compliance with these rules is essential. ... Teaching 
our new hires that compliance … leads to ineffective 
procurement is absolutely the wrong message. Let’s get rid 
of agency management that believes this message and give 
the bright new folks being hired the freedom to do effective 
procurement–within the rules.
We return to our mantra: the government needs people, lots more people to 
(1) plan, which includes understanding what outcome will be sought from 
the private sector; (2) understand and accurately describe that outcome (or 
task) to the private sector; (3) select appropriate, qualified contractors in a 
timely fashion; (4) negotiate cost-effective agreements and draft clear con-
tracts that contain effective incentives (or profit mechanisms) to maximize 
contractor performance; (5) manage the contractual relationship to ensure 
that the government receives value for its money; and (6) provide appropriate 
oversight throughout the process to, among other things, avoid corruption. 
See also Ralph C. Nash & Vernon J. Edwards, Dateline, March 2007, Acquisi-
tion Planning: The Missing Link, 21 N&CR: “The lack of timely and sound 
planning is a constant theme in reports of [IGs] and the [GAO]. …. It appears 
that many agencies just do not devote the necessary attention to this vital 
aspect of the process. It is not much of a stretch to say that the lack of good 
acquisition planning is at the root of many, if not most, of the poor acquisition 
procedures that are being reported almost continuously at present.”
Vi. oUTSoURCinG AnD THe BLenDeD WoRKFoRCe. 
A. The Future of outsourcing? A casual reader might conclude that 
the U.S. government currently is engaged in a broad-based, thoughtful 
examination of its outsourcing policy, although some, including a hand-
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ful of academics, are skeptical of the approach. For example, consider the 
new book, Paul Verkuil, outsourcing soVereignty: Why PriVatization of 
goVernment functions threatens Democracy anD What We can Do about 
it (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) (as the title suggests, the author senses 
a government abdication of responsibility for governance, generally, and, 
more specifically, inherently governmental functions); see also, Richard 
J. Pierce, Jr., Book Review: Outsourcing Sovereignty by Paul Verkuil, Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming, 2008). The debate seems to span agencies – 
both civilian and military – and functions of every conceivable type. See, gener-
ally, Panel Urges Better Management of Government Outsourcing, 49 GC ¶ 423 
(“Better management of Government outsourcing will require heightened 
contract oversight instead of exhaustive legal calisthenics aimed at parsing 
the subtleties of what constitutes an inherently governmental function….”); 
House Approves Measure to Kill Outsourced Tax Collection And Delay Vendor 
Withholding Tax, 49 GC ¶ 394; House Bill Repeals IRS Authority to Outsource 
Collection Activities, 49 GC ¶ 285; Grassley Defends IRS’ Private Debt Collec-
tion Program as House Committee Explores Its Value, 49 GC ¶ 222; Confer-
ence Highlights A-76 Successes and Missteps, 49 GC ¶ 188; IRS Private Debt 
Collection Program Receives Positive IG Report, 49 GC ¶ 148; Army Officials 
Testify That A-76 Process Caused Walter Reed Decay, 49 GC ¶ 101; National 
Taxpayer Advocate Calls for IRS Private Debt Collection Repeal, 49 GC ¶ 23. 
But it’s often “sound and fury, signifying nothing.”
GAO is not alone in painting a sobering picture of the outsourcing deci-
sional process at, for example, DHS. “Decisions to contract for . . . services were 
driven by the need for staff and expertise to get programs up and operations 
up and running . . . [Yet, even where] the original justification for contracting, 
such as immediate need, had changed, . . . components continued to use con-
tractors without reassessing who . . . should perform a given function.” DHS 
Needs Better Oversight for Contractors Supporting Inherently Government 
Functions, 49 GC ¶ 402; GAO-08-142T, Department of Homeland Security: 
Risk Assessment and Enhanced Oversight Needed to Manage Reliance on 
Contractors (Oct. 17, 2007), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d08142t.
pdf; U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, 
Hearing, Is DHS Too Dependent on Contractors to Do the Government’s Work? 
(Oct. 17, 2007); GAO-07-990, Department of Homeland Security: Improved 
Assessment and Oversight Needed to Manage Risk of Contracting for Selected 
Services (Sept. 17, 2007), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d07990.pdf; 
Testimony of Scott Amey, General Counsel, Project on Government Oversight 
(POGO) Before the House Committee on Homeland Security “Responsibil-
ity in Federal Homeland Security Contracting,” (Apr. 20, 2007), available at 
www.pogo.org/p/contracts/ct-070420-contracting.html; Accountability in 
Government Contracting Act of 2007 (S. 680).
B. The Blended Workforce: Still Practicing, Little Policy. It may be 
too late to call it a trend, but the blended workforce – the reality that govern-
ment functions, both military and civilian, are accomplished by ill-defined 
government-and-contractor teams – is here to stay, despite the government’s 
continued lack of preparation to operate in such an environment. “Federal 
workers frequently are co-located with contractor personnel in the same 
government offices, virtually indistinguishable, and often doing the same or 
similar work. . . . The blended workforce is woven into the government’s fabric 
for the foreseeable future. The challenge for the acquisition community is to 
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recognize this extraordinary transfer of responsibilities and make it work 
in the public interest.” Richard J. Bednar & Gary P. Quigley, Viewpoint: The 
Blended Workforce, goV’t exec. (May 1, 2007). Numerous issues are raised 
by, yet rarely resolved in advance with regard to, these relationships. See, 
generally, Vernon J. Edwards, The Blended Workforce: Another Concern, 21 
N&CR ¶ 9:
under a blended workforce contract, agencies and their 
contractors must make a special effort to manage not only 
the relationships between themselves, but the relationships 
among their respective employees.… The parties must … 
discuss the boundaries of legitimate conduct and interaction 
and how they will identify and resolve workforce issues. They 
must exchange information about their human resource 
policies …. To mitigate the risks, … agencies and contractors 
… must ensure that their employees are informed about the 
professional and personal risks to which they are exposed, the 
professional and personal boundaries that must be erected 
and maintained, and the possible professional and personal 
consequences of failing to do so…. [I]t is especially important 
that [government] employees have a clear understanding of 
what constitutes the scope of their office and employment.
See also, Ralph C. Nash, Postscript II: Mixed Workforce Questions, 21 N&CR 
¶ 3 (highlighting concerns related to proprietary information).
C. Misguided focus on comparative “cost” of outsourcing. Seri-
ously, it’s not about the money. Although cost savings are sometimes deemed 
a benefit of privatization, some critics continue to question whether contrac-
tors are more cost-effective. See, e.g., U.S. House Committee on Government 
Reform, Additional Information About Blackwater USA (Oct. 1, 2007) (noting 
that taxpayers spend 600 percent more to use a $1,222-per-day Blackwater 
security specialist than an Army Sergeant who receives $140 to $190 per 
day). In any event, we remain convinced that the potential for cost savings 
alone should not be deemed a primary benefit of reliance upon contractors, 
and slavish focus upon the relative cost of contractor support is misguided. 
Specifically, it is not productive to criticize agencies for paying contractors 
“too much” without: (1) permitting, as an alternative, an agency to hire addi-
tional personnel; (2) confirming that sufficient personnel are available in the 
marketplace and willing to work for the government; (3) comparing “apples 
to apples,” such as taking into account all of the long-term or legacy costs of 
civil servants or members of the armed services; and (4) considering critical 
issues such as flexibility and surge capacity. For example, higher contractor 
salaries may be offset, at least in part, by long-run costs avoided. Indeed, a 
strong case could be made that, for short-term demands for additional re-
sources, it makes sense to pay higher, and potentially significantly higher, 
amounts for contractor support (rather than incurring the cost of additional 
government employees).
This complex topic is well beyond the scope of these briefing materials, but 
for an interesting attempt to make some apples-to-apples comparisons, see 
Congressional Budget Office, Logistics Support (comparing the costs of using 
government employees and private contractors to support the U.S. military), 
available at www/cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=6749. See also GAO-07-998T, 
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Peacekeeping: Observations on Costs, Strengths, and Limitations of U.S. and 
UN Operations (June 13, 2007) (noting that to deploy 872 civilian officers, the 
U.N. budgeted $25 million whereas it would cost the U.S. an estimated $217 
million; and for pay and support of military troops, the U.N. budgeted $131 
million whereas it would cost the U.S. an estimated $260 million), available at 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d07998t.pdf). But see Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law 
Values in a Privatized World, 31 yale J. int’l l. 383, 395-96 (2006) (noting that 
the cost savings of not providing benefits to employees of private contractors 
who can be hired on a short-term basis and are typically not unionized may be 
offset by the lack of competition in the military contracting process). 
 Vii.  iRAQ PRoCUReMenT, ConTRACToRS on THe BATTLe- 
  FieLD, AnD THe MoDeRn eRA oF PRiVATe SeCURiTY
A. iraq Procurement Dominates The Headlines. It’s a lot of money. It’s 
all over the newspapers, Internet, television. And it’s not going away anytime 
soon. Accordingly, procurement in Iraq will continue to dominate congressional 
and public perception of the state of federal public procurement. DPAP Gives 
More Guidance on Contracting Procedures in Iraq and Afghanistan, 49 GC ¶ 428; 
Inadequate Documentation Stymies SIGIR Review of Iraq Reconstruction Man-
agement, 49 GC ¶ 426; House Committee Presses for Details On Iraq Embassy 
Contracts, 49 GC ¶ 390; HASC Holds Hearing on Alleged Fraud and Corruption 
Surrounding Defense Support Contracts in Iraq, 49 GC ¶ 363; DOD Contract-
ing in Iraq Still Poorly Managed, Comp. Gen. Says, 49 GC ¶ 189; LOGCAP 
Pitfalls Follow Familiar Themes, SASC Finds, 49 GC ¶ 177; Deconstruction 
Reconstruction: Senate Tackles Management of Post-Conflict Rebuilding Efforts, 
49 GC ¶ 124; DCAA Finds Unsupported Iraq Contract Costs; Top Government 
Auditors Define ‘Waste’, 49 GC ¶ 65; Deteriorating Security in Iraq Hampers 
Reconstruction, SIGIR Reports, 49 GC ¶ 46; Watchdog Report Compiles Evidence 
of Contractors’ Failure to Rebuild Iraqi Healthcare, 49 GC ¶ 35; Lack of Access 
to Iraq Data Frustrates Top Investigators, 49 GC ¶ 32; GAO Urges Congress to 
Ask Tough Questions About Iraq, 49 GC ¶ 13.
B. A Busy SiGiR. Some of the news is encouraging, but it’s easily drowned 
out by relentless media coverage focused upon the seemingly inexhaustible 
anecdotes of sub-optimal acquisition outcomes. The Special Inspector General 
for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) concedes that: “the incidence of corruption 
within the U.S. reconstruction program . . . appears to constitute a relatively 
small component of the overall American financial contribution to Iraq’s recon-
struction. . . . [L]osses to American taxpayers from fraud within reconstruction 
programs will likely amount to a relatively small component of the overall 
investment in Iraq, totaling in the tens of millions (rather than hundreds of 
millions or billions, as is sometimes imagined). However, . . . [the SIGIR has] 
found egregious incidents of fraud.” Statement of Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., War 
Profiteering and Other Contractor Crimes Committed Overseas, SIGIR 07-012T 
at 2-3 (June 19, 2007), available at www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/testimony/ 
SIGIR_Testimony_07-012T.pdf. See, generally, www.sigir.mil, and specifi-
cally, www.sigir.mil/reports/Default.aspx (for Quarterly Reports to Congress, 
Testimony, Lessons Learned Reports, Audit Reports (with more than 100 is-
sued), Project Assessments, and other reports). If only the media, public, and 
Congress understood the basics. As Bowen explained:
[O]ur lessons learned report on contracting and procurement 
[explains that…] the goals of contingency contracting differ 
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… from other government contracting: the work is done in a 
dangerous and ever-evolving environment. Contracting under 
these circumstances requires an agency’s most experienced 
contracting and program management personnel and top level 
oversight to address conditions in a fast paced environment 
that is particularly vulnerable to waste, fraud and abuse. … 
[C]ontractors bear a high degree of risk, and thus are more 
likely to perform work under cost reimbursable contracts 
which have to be carefully managed to ensure results.
C. increased, Yet Limited Transparency. Congress and the public only 
recently came to grips with the reality that, in Iraq, the number of contrac-
tors rivals that of our military presence. See, e.g., T. Christian Miller, Private 
Contractors Outnumber US Troops in Iraq, l.a. times (July 4, 2007). Prior 
estimates seem to demonstrate the escalating use of contractors in Iraq. See, 
e.g., GAO-06-865T, Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed to Improve the Use 
of Private Security Providers (June 13, 2006) (20,000 contractors in 2005 and 
48,000 as of March 2006), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d06865t.
pdf; Testimony of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, U.S. House Appropria-
tions Defense Subcommittee Hearing, Defense Department Budget for Fiscal 
Year 2008 (Mar. 29, 2007) (126,000 contractors); Kris Osborn, McCaffrey: 
600 US Contractors Have Been Killed in Iraq, Defense neWs (Apr. 16, 2007) 
(130,000 contractors), available at http://www.defensenews.com/story.
php?F=2688598&C=mideast. Moreover, although far from easily accessible 
and, arguably, generated for unrelated purposes, Labor Department data 
suggests that contractors are increasingly paying the ultimate price for their 
service in Iraq. See, generally, Report: 14 Percent of Iraqis Now Displaced, 
knight riDDer (November 6, 2007):
The deaths of 72 civilian contractors working on U.S.-funded 
projects in Iraq were reported to the U.S. Department of Labor 
during the third quarter of the year, a 22 percent increase 
over the average of previous quarters…. The deaths brought 
to 1,073 the number of civilians working on U.S.-funded 
projects who’ve died in Iraq since the war there began....
David Ivanovich, Information Incomplete on Iraq Contractors, houston chron. 
(August 9, 2007):
While acknowledging the death toll of contractors working 
in Iraq has crossed the milestone of 1,000, the government 
Wednesday provided incomplete information about the 
companies the victims worked for or their nationalities.... 
[A]s of June 30, 1,001 civilian contractors working for U.S. 
firms had died … including 231 in the first six months of 
2007.... While military casualties are updated daily and 
posted on the Pentagon’s Web site, civilian contractor deaths 
are updated only quarterly…. The [Labor] department broke 
down 776 contractor deaths by company, leaving out almost a 
fourth…, and did not include all companies whose employees 
or contractors have died…. The list … doesn’t include … KBR, 
the Pentagon’s largest contractor operating in Iraq, Kuwait 
and Afghanistan, which has acknowledged [more than 100] 
fatalities in the Middle East.
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D. Private Security. A single incident on September 16 involving Black-
water, a high-profile private security firm, graphically demonstrated that 
the risks in the government’s increasing and, at times, disturbingly chaotic 
reliance upon private security are particularly grave; the existing legal and 
regulatory regimes are inadequate to address them; and the government 
waited far too long to address these issues in a thoughtful and responsible 
manner. The September 16 engagement appears to have become the proverbial 
straw that broke the camel’s back, forcing private security into the mainstream 
media and leaving Congress little choice but to do “something.” DOD and 
State Sign Private Security Contractor Agreement, 49 GC ¶ 463; Proposed 
Legislation Would Phase Out U.S. Private Security Contractors Overseas, 49 GC 
¶ 458; State Department Panel Recommends Enhanced Oversight of Security 
Contractors, 49 GC ¶ 413; DOD Wants Single Entity to Oversee Private Se-
curity Contractors, 49 GC ¶ 403; Private Security Contracting Comes Under 
Fire From House Oversight Committee, 49 GC ¶ 372; COFC to Consider Issues 
Posed by Private Security Contracting as Senate Considers FY 2008 NDAA, 
49 GC ¶ 262. It’s surprising it took so long. Peter Singer’s popular book, cor-
Porate Warriors: the rise of the PriVatizeD military inDustry, was published 
in 2003; the popular FRONTLINE documentary Private Warriors, aired in 
2005, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors; and the National 
Defense University’s Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) conducted 
two lengthy studies on privatized military operations in 2006, www.ndu.
edu/ICAF/Industry/reports/2006/pdf/2006_PMOIS.pdf, and in 2007, www.
ndu.edu/ICAF/Industry/reports/2007/pdf/2007_PMOIS.pdf. Yet numerous 
issues remain unresolved, as suggested by a recent Princeton University work-
shop with senior military and government officials, contractors, academic ex-
perts, and policymakers. See Press Release, Princeton’s Law and Public Affairs 
Program Releases Consensus Findings on Legal Framework Governing U.S. 
Military Contractors (Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://lapa.princeton.edu/
newsdetail.php?ID=17; Workshop Summary, Princeton Problem-Solving Work-
shop Series in Law and Security: A New Legal Framework for Military Con-
tractors? (June 8, 2007), available at http://lapa.princeton.edu/conferences/ 
military07/MilCon_Workshop_Summary.pdf. See also, Patrick Cullen & 
Peter Ezra Weinberger, Reframing the Defense Outsourcing Debate: Merging 
Government Oversight with Industry Partnership, Peace Operations Institute 
(2007) (“[POI] is a nonprofit research organization established ... by staff 
from the International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) ... dedicated to 
improving education about peace and stability operations and to promoting 
practical solutions to peacekeeping operations.”) The authors explain that: 
“This report shifts the discussion of the government’s role in defense con-
tract oversight away from an exclusive focus on guarding against contractor 
malpractice—an important issue that has nevertheless been exaggerated in 
the media—towards an understanding of contract oversight as a process of 
government-industry partnership.”
e. The Wartime Contracting Commission. All signs point to a Con-
gressional mandate of a wartime contracting commission during 2008. The 
commission’s extremely ambitious mandate could include, among other things: 
(1) a study of reconstruction, logistical support, and security contracting in 
Iraq and Afghanistan; (2) a review of the extent of governmental reliance upon 
contractors and the impact of that reliance; (3) an assessment of the quality 
of contractor performance and the mechanisms by which performance is mea-
sured; (4) an effort to gauge the extent of contractor fraud, waste, and abuse 
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and the extent to which responsible parties are held accountable; (5) a review 
of both the DOD’s and the State Department’s “organizational structure, poli-
cies, practices, and resources” relating to program management and contract-
ing; and (6) an assessment of contractor use and mis-use of force, the law of war, 
and related issues. See, generally, Wartime Contracting Commission Survives 
Defense Authorization Bill Negotiations, 49 GC ¶ 469; House Approves Proposal 
to Criminalize Wartime Profiteering From Fraudulent Contracting, 49 GC 
¶ 407; Congress to Focus on Accountability of Battlefield Contractors, 49 GC 
¶ 387 (House passes the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) 
Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007); Bill Would Establish Commission to 
Investigate Wartime Contracting, 49 GC ¶ 296; War Profiteering Bill Approved 
By Senate Judiciary Committee, 49 GC ¶ 194; Officials and Lawmakers Agree 
That Stiffer Criminal Penalties May Better Deter War Profiteering, 49 GC ¶ 
123; Leahy Targets War Profiteering and Corruption, 49 GC ¶ 14.
Viii. ConTRACToR CoMPLAinCe AnD inTeGRiTY. As discussed 
elsewhere (particularly in the Chapter in these materials by Joseph D. West 
& Diana G. Richard on Corporate Compliance and Ethics), Congress is prod-
ding the contractor community to make investments in compliance on a scale 
not experienced since the late 1980’s. The proposed compliance regimes are 
as controversial as they are broad-reaching. David M. Nadler & Justin A. 
Chiaodo, Feature Comment: The Proposed Rule on Contractor Compliance 
Program and Integrity Reporting—An Ill-Conceived Over-reaction to Recent 
Procurement Scandals, 49 GC ¶ 474 (December 19, 2007); FAR Councils 
Propose Expanding Ethics and Business Conduct Rule, 49 GC ¶ 446; Grass-
ley Proposes Significant Changes to FCA, 49 GC ¶ 359; DOD Directive and 
Congressional Bill Afford Stronger Protections to Whistleblowers, 49 GC ¶ 
301; House Panel Considers Central Repository to Weed Out Unsatisfactory 
Contractors, 49 GC ¶ 281; Millions in Improper Payments Recovered, DOD 
IG Says, 49 GC ¶ 272; SASC Approves Whistleblower Protections for Defense 
Contractor Employees, 49 GC ¶ 225; Thinktank Says Congress Needs to 
Clean Up Procurement Process Mess; Industry Group Responds, 49 GC ¶ 212, 
see also Scott Lilly, A Return to Competitive Contracting Congress Needs to 
Clean Up the Procurement Process Mess (May 2007), www.americanprogress.
org/issues/2007/05/pdf/procurement_paper.pdf; see also PSC Response 
at www.pscouncil.org/pdfs/centerwhitepaper.pdf (“the report’s conclusions 
are almost entirely underpinned by misstatements and misinterpretations 
of fact. Rather than serving as a thoughtful, analytical report, the report is 
little more than a collection of rhetoric and anecdotes.”); Better Contractor 
Tax Enforcement Needed, GAO Administrator Testifies, 49 GC ¶ 182; Chris-
topher R. Yukins, Feature Comment: Enhancing Integrity-Aligning Proposed 
Contractor Compliance Requirements With Broader Advances In Corporate 
Compliance, 49 GC ¶ 165; David Nadler, Feature Comment: The Proposed Rule 
on Contractor Code of Ethics and Business Conduct—A Sign of the Times and 
Useful Guidance for All Contractors, 49 GC ¶ 144; Whistleblower Protection 
Legislation Faces Veto Threat, 49 GC ¶ 127; FAR Councils Propose Contractor 
Code of Ethics and Business Conduct, 49 GC ¶ 82; Collins Targets Wasteful 
Contracting Practices at Home and Abroad, 49 GC ¶ 81; Prevention is the Key 
to Minimizing Fraud, Waste and Abuse in Recovery Efforts, GAO Says, 49 GC 
¶ 47; Senate Reintroduces Whistleblower Protection Legislation, 49 GC ¶ 27; 
Paul R. Hurst & Andrew D. Irwin, Feature Comment: Past Is Prologue—The 
Clean Contracting Act as the Paradigm for Procurement Reform in the 100th 
Congress, 49 GC ¶ 21.
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iX. SMALL BUSineSS, SoCiAL AnD eConoMiC PoLiCieS. Even as 
it grows, everyone wants a piece of the federal procurement pie. If anything, 
the growing pie seems to attract more attention. See, generally, Advocacy 
Group Critical of SBA ‘Top 100’ List of Small Business Contractors, 49 GC 
¶ 452; Senate Committee Approves Proposal to Shore Up SBA Contracting 
Set-Asides, 49 GC ¶ 435; Delay of WOSB Set-Aside Program Draws House 
Small Business Committee Ire, 49 GC ¶ 382; House Subcommittee Hears 
Testimony On Federal Contracting Barriers for Minority-Owned Small 
Business, 49 GC ¶ 370; Lawmakers Respond to SBA FY 2006 Small Busi-
ness Report, 49 GC ¶ 330; House Subcommittee Explores Negative Effects of 
Contract Bundling, 49 GC ¶ 292; SBA Proposes Changes to Small Business 
Size-Status Calculation, 49 GC ¶ 297; Senate Small Business Committee 
Spotlights Small Business Contracting, 49 GC ¶ 282; Anti-Bundling Bill 
Aims to Improve Small Business Access to Federal Contracts, 49 GC ¶ 183; 
David M. Nadler & Joseph R. Berger, Feature Comment: New Small Business 
Re-Certification Rules Strike the Right Balance, 49 GC ¶ 1. See also, Ralph 
C. Nash, Small Business Subcontracting Plans: An Evaluation Factor?, 21 
N&CR ¶ 39 (“wonder[ing] why an agency would make small business sub-
contracting plans an evaluation factor requiring comparative evaluation of 
the plans as part of the source selection process”).
A. new Legislation. The House of Representatives overwhelming passed 
the Small Business Fairness in Contracting Act (H.R. 1873), amending the Small 
Business Act (P.L. 85-536) to enhance small business participation in federal 
contracting. The measure would expand the definition of prohibited contract 
bundling to include construction contracts for the first time. Moreover, it 
would raise the small business goal from 23 to 30 percent (after only a decade 
at 23 percent, up from the prior 20 percent standard), while increasing the goal 
for small disadvantaged businesses (SDB) and women-owned businesses from 
five to eight percent. (We leave for another day what impact, if any, this would 
have on the consistently ineffective post-Adarand SDB preference program.) 
The bill also attempts to limit large business participation in small business 
contracts and to craft meaningful limits to the exceptions to the 8(a) program 
enjoyed by Alaska Native Corporations (ANC’s). The White House opposes 
the measure. See House Overwhelmingly Passes Controversial Small Business 
Fairness in Contracting Act, 49 GC ¶ 202. 
B. Thirty Percent Small Business Goal? The goal increase is par-
ticularly intriguing. The White House called the 30-percent goal “unrealistic.” 
Although SBA announced that the Government reached the 23-percent small 
business contracting goal for fiscal years 2005 and 2006, critics are skeptical. 
SBA reported that for FY 2006, the Government came close, reaching 22.8 
percent. House Democrats disputed SBA’s announcement for FY 2005, see 48 
GC ¶ 275, and Eagle Eye Publishing reported in 2005 and 2006 that the Gov-
ernment did not meet the 23-percent goal. See 49 GC ¶ 104(a). Of the various 
other socioeconomic small business contracting goals – including five percent 
to small disadvantaged businesses, five percent to women-owned small busi-
nesses, three percent to Historically Underutilized Business Zone participants, 
and three percent to service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses – SBA 
reported that only the small disadvantaged business goal was reached.
C. Large Business Participation in Small-Business Contracts. 
The bill would limit participation in small business contracts by firms 
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that are not small. Businesses “close to exceeding” the small business 
standard on which the contract was given small business status would be 
required to recertify annually to the agency awarding the contract that 
the business has not exceeded the relevant small business standard. An-
nual small business recertification remains controversial, and, currently, 
no congressional mandate requires firms performing ongoing contracts to 
certify annually that they still meet the relevant small business standard. 
While small business advocates hoped for a broad annual recertification 
provision, Emily Murphy, former GSA chief acquisition officer believes 
the new SBA rule, 13 CFR § 121.404(g), adequately addresses the issue. 
See 49 GC ¶ 1.
D. Fixing Bad Data? The bill also would require each agency IG to 
annually report to Congress on the number and dollar value of contract 
awards that were coded as small business awards but were not made to 
small businesses. Murphy likes this provision because: “It puts respon-
sibility back on the agencies to confirm that businesses performing their 
small business contracts are actually small – instead of simply relying 
on the [Central Contractor Registration (CCR) database and Online 
Representations and Certifications Application] system.” Small business 
advocates argue that until there is greater transparency in how small 
business awards are counted, legislated small business goals are meaning-
less. Lloyd Chapman of the American Small Business League says that 
simply taking SBA’s word on small business goals is “like playing poker 
over the telephone.”
e. Alaska native Corporations: Slowing the Gravy Train? A 
particularly controversial section of the bill provides that unless Congress 
enacts a law by Dec. 31, 2007, revising limits on the value of sole source 
contracting under the SBA’s 8(a) program exception for ANC’s, the OFPP 
administrator, in consultation with the SBA administrator, “shall establish 
appropriate limits.” Last year the GAO said the program, described by Rep. 
Betty McCollum (D-Minn.) as “the only non-gaming economic develop-
ment program that has worked” for native Alaskans, has been misused by 
agencies “as a quick, easy and legal method of awarding contracts for any 
value.” Rep. Henry Waxman said the provision assured continued dialogue 
on the issue. Murphy called the provision a fascinating approach sure to 
result in a long and interesting political process. 49 GC ¶ 202.
F. Goaling Report and Scorecard. SBA released its annual “goaling 
report” on federal small business contracting data, and the first of what 
will be an annual scorecard of agencies’ achievement of small business 
contracting goals and progress toward improving small business con-
tracting in the future. SBA Administrator Steven Preston explained that 
“data scrubbing” from FY 2005 revealed more than $4 billion in contracts 
miscoded as small business actions. Preston said the goaling reports and 
scorecard will “drive greater transparency, greater integrity and greater 
accountability in small business contracting that should improve small 
businesses’ ability to get Federal Government contracts.” See SBA Releases 
GY 2006 Small Business Contracting Data, Scorecard, 49 GC ¶ 323.
The scorecard–a green, yellow, red system–reflects each agency’s per-
formance in two categories: current small business contracting status, and 
progress toward improving future small business contracting. Agencies earn 
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a green score on current small business contracting by meeting their small 
business goal and at least two of the four socioeconomic contracting targets. 
For the progress category, agencies earn a green score for demonstrating 
top-level commitment to improving small business contracting through the 
implementation of a small business contracting plan or strategy, accountabil-
ity for not meeting goals, staff training and outreach to small businesses. In 
scoring the agencies, Preston said SBA was committed to making an honest 
assessment. Only seven agencies earned a green score for current small busi-
ness contracting. Five agencies received yellow and 12 scored red, including 
DOD and GSA. The progress category was more positive, with 12 agencies 
earning green, eight yellow and just four red. Reports for agency scoring are 
available at www.sba.gov/aboutsba/sbaprograms/goals. 
SBA also released the raw data for FY 2006 small business contracting in 
the form of a goaling report. The report indicates each agency’s eligible small 
business actions, eligible dollars, actual small business actions, actual small 
business dollars and the resulting small business contracting percentage. The 
report contains additional raw data on each agency’s performance within the 
socioeconomic contracting programs. The report reveals that DOD’s small 
business contracting percentage for FY 2006 was 21.8 percent, below the 
Government-wide goal and below its agency small business goal established 
by SBA. GSA’s total small business contracting in FY 2006 was 32.2 percent, 
above the Government-wide goal but below the goal it established with SBA, 
which resulted in its red score. Major agencies with strong small business 
contracting results include SBA (67 percent), HUD (66 percent) and Interior 
(55 percent). 49 GC ¶ 323. 
G. GSA’s GWAC efforts to Funnel iT Contracts to Small Busi-
nesses. GSA is adding to its stable of Government-wide Acquisition Con-
tracts (GWACs) by launching the Alliant Small Business (ASB) GWAC, a 
competitive multiple award, indefinite-delivery, indefinite quantity set-aside 
small business contract. The ASB GWAC is designed to provide worldwide 
IT solutions to federal agencies while strengthening opportunities in federal 
contracting for small businesses. GSA selected 62 small businesses to receive 
awards in a set-aside worth up to $15 billion to acquire IT. The ASB contract 
runs for five years, with a five-year option. Calling ASB “a key component of 
the Federal Acquisition Service (FAS) portfolio of technology solutions,” FAS 
Commissioner James A. Williams said it “allows our customers to acquire 
IT solutions in a streamlined, flexible manner.” ASB was developed within 
the framework prescribed by OMB’s new IT investment budget guidance to 
comply with federal policies governing IT investments. 50 GC ¶ 5.
H. Free Trade Agreements and Small Business Limitations. 
Small business advocates are increasingly aware that Free Trade Agree-
ments may present challenges to U.S. small business growth and sustain-
ability. While the FAR expressly excludes small business set-asides from 
trade agreements, FAR 25.401(a), popular modern contract vehicles with 
increased work and dollar values may attract the attention of existing or 
future trading partners. Prior to 1980, foreign contractors met significant 
obstacles in accessing the lucrative U.S. procurement markets because of the 
restrictions imposed by the Buy American Act (BAA), 41 U.S.C. §§10a-10d, 
which restricts the purchase of supplies, services, and construction materials 
that are not domestic end products. The BAA provides a preference for domes-
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tic suppliers and domestic end products by augmenting the price of nondo-
mestic bids or offers by a stated percentage (six or twelve percent, the latter 
if the lowest domestic offer is from a small business concern) to determine 
the reasonableness of the cost of domestic suppliers’ prices. FAR 25.105(b). 
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2501 et seq., creates waivers 
of the BAA for eligible products from countries that have signed international 
trade agreements, such that, above certain dollar thresholds, end products 
and construction materials from eligible countries receive nondiscriminatory 
treatment in evaluation alongside domestic offers. To the extent that bilateral 
and multilateral agreements do not confer national treatment to offerors with 
respect to acquisitions under certain monetary thresholds, domestic small 
businesses often are insulated from foreign competition.
What is provocative is how far this protectionism will go in a procurement 
system that increasingly relies on GWAC’s and other ID/IQ contracts. Those 
vehicles, also known as “framework” agreements in Europe, tend to obscure 
protectionism, because the orders made under GWAC’s and ID/IQ contracts 
are so hard to track. Moreover, because a marketplace dominated by GWAC’s 
and ID/IQ contracts is a marketplace that favors relationships over best value, 
foreign competitors in that marketplace confront a competitive disadvantage 
against domestic firms with existing relationships with agency personnel.
Free trade agreements increasingly focus on facilitating access to foreign 
procurement markets. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Government 
Procurement Agreement (GPA) and the several bilateral Free Trade Agree-
ments (FTAs) have been instrumental in opening United States procurement 
markets to foreign contractors and vice versa. The objectives of trade negotia-
tion with respect to government procurement are generally to (1) establish 
rules requiring government procurement procedures and practices in the 
trading partner to be fair, transparent, and predictable for suppliers of U.S. 
goods and services that seek to do business with the trading partner and 
(2) expand access for U.S. goods and services to the government procurement 
market of the trading partner. See, e.g, Jean Heilman Grier, Recent Develop-
ments in International Trade Agreements Covering Government Procurement, 
35 Pub. cont. l.J. 385, 398 (Spring 2006). Those negotiating goals – to expand 
foreign export markets – tend to obscure the procurement system’s more pa-
rochial goals of gaining access to foreign goods and services to achieve best 
value. As the U.S. opens its procurement market to more and more nations, 
the procurement community must increasingly understand that the domestic 
procurement system is part of a global supply chain.
 For example, probably the most extensive free trade agreements relating 
to procurement—in terms of establishing specific procurement methods, notice 
requirements, and solicitation response times—is the United States-Australia 
Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act or AUSFTA. Through the agree-
ment, Australia became a “designated” country and, as such, its contractors 
are eligible for nondiscriminatory treatment and, in certain circumstances, 
are placed on the same competitive footing as U.S. contractors (and, of course, 
those contractors from other designated countries). Nonetheless, the AUSFTA 
includes the normal exclusion of U.S. acquisitions set-aside for small busi-
nesses. FAR 25.401(a); Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, Ch. 
15, Sec. 7 (General Notes), available at www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/ 
us_fta/final-text/chapter_15.html. As an emerging issue, therefore, while 
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small business are currently insulated from foreign competition when procure-
ments are set-aside for small business, existing or future trading partners 
may seek to eliminate FAR 25.401(a) (exclusions of small business set-asides 
from trade agreements) in light of the United States’ use of new contract 
vehicles such as GWACs. 
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